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The paper combines recent discourse theory with an analysis of European
governance. It conceptualises the European polity as a heterarchical political
structure, which ties together the domestic, the governmental and the
supranational level of the EU. For being efficient, effective and leading to a high
quality, policy making in this structure must be based on policy deliberation.
Important institutional features of the EU can be explained as reflecting this
insight and as efforts to realise the necessary institutional preconditions of
deliberation. A deliberative perspective on governance finally informs
normative concerns by highlighting the need to put additional emphasis on
accountability, a broad representation of societal actors and a legalisation of
political interaction.
Keywords: governance, integration theory, joint decision making, multilevel
governance, participation, political representation, supranationalism1. WHO GOVERNS IN THE EU?
Most modern political theories agree that non-coercive public order presupposes
a discursive interaction both among different parts of society, and the society at
large and government.
1 Majoritarian decision-making and the delegation of
power to a ruling actor or institution is only accepted by citizens if the ruling
majority is obliged to publicly justify their policies by reference to broadly
consented norms and if it does so in an open and unlimited discourse (Habermas
1992, Rawls 1971). As opposed to modern political theory, European integration
theory has little sensitivity for the linkage between political order and discourse.
Same as international relations theory, it tends to situate governance structures
on a continuum of power concentration that ranges from hierarchy on the one
side to anarchy on the other, without placing the analysis of discursive structures
at the centre of a given political structure. To be sure, the anarchy/hierarchy
dichotomy has proven to be a powerful heuristic device for political science
because it fostered understanding of the structural differences between
international and domestic politics, equating hierarchy with (domestic) order and
anarchy with (international) disorder. If applied to the analysis of the European
Union (EU), however, it is difficult to make sense of the distinction. Socio-
economic interdependence and political internationalisation has propelled a
process, in which nation-states increasingly pool their sovereignties (Keohane
and Hoffman, 1991) and empower supranational institutions to cope with those
tasks they are no longer able to deal with autonomously. “Governance without
government” (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992), “governance beyond the nation-
state” (Zürn, 2000), the emergence of “law above the state” (Volcansek, 1997;
Neyer, 1999) and a “legalisation of international politics” (Abbott et al., 2000)
are eminent features of the EU. Political interaction no longer follows the logic
of strategic bargaining only but becomes sensitive to "inappropriate" behaviour
(March and Olson, 1998). “Constitutionalisation” has become an important term
for describing the new reality of European governance (Alter, 2001; Pernice,
1999; Weiler, 2000), pinpointing the embeddedness of a formerly diplomatic
mode of interaction in a binding formalized legal structure.
Neither the concept of intergovernmental anarchy nor of supranational
hierarchy is able to analytically grasp these new phenomena.
Intergovernmentalism too easily disregards the dependence of governments on
supranational institutions for realising governmental interests (Sandholtz and
1.The paper is a revised version of two seminars given at ARENA in Oslo at 22 January 2002
(Neyer, 2002) and the EUI in Florence at 14 February 2002. The author is grateful for helpful
comments by the participants of the seminars, Rebecca Steffenson, Erik O. Eriksen, Andreas
Follesdal and the two anonymous reviewers of the EUI working paper series. The usual
disclaimer applies.2
Stone Sweet, 1997). It tends to overlook that the EU describes a legalised
venture in which powers and sovereignties are pooled, legal authorities are
established and states are no longer free to pursue whatever policy they deem to
be in their interest (Weiler, 1991; Alter, 2001). Mutual regard for the concerns
of other member states and respect for the binding character of European law are
essential elements of participating in a joint exercise of European governance.
The idea of a supranational hierarchy with the Commission and/or the
ECJ as de facto governing bodies, however, is equally misleading. The EU lacks
a central actor with powers to individually legislate and enforce. Even in issue
areas in which the Commission has broad discretionary powers, it still must
respect that it has no power to coerce member states and that it must safeguard
its decisions to keep them acceptable to its member states and the member
states’ publics (Neyer and Zürn, 2001). Open cases of non-compliance, such as
in the infamous BSE case, or less dramatic cases of silent non-implementation
of EU law (Börzel, 2002) underline that the effectiveness of postnational
governance rests on the precondition that member states „accept it as an
autonomous voluntary act, endlessly renewed on each occasion, of
subordination“ (Weiler, 2000: 13). Although it is true that the legitimacy of
courts is based not least on the application of legal reasoning (deducing
decisions from general normative rules in an argumentative manner, cf.
Dworkin, 1991; Mattli and Slaughter, 1998), it also is hardly imaginable that the
political status of the ECJ in the European institutional system would not suffer
if its decision were a permanent political affront to the member states (Garrett et
al., 1998).
The aim of this paper is to sketch an approach to European governance
that places the analysis of discursive structures at its centre. According to such a
perspective, postnational governance must be understood as a heterarchical
political structure which encompasses the domestic, the governmental and the
supranational level (infra 2). It is neither restricted to a supranational vertical
order nor to an intergovernmental horizontal order but accepts both elements as
being essential parts of one political structure. Because combining vertical and
horizontal means of interaction can neither rely on pure bargaining nor on the
issuing of commands, its basic means of political interaction must be policy
deliberation, which is as a mode of problem-solving functionally superior to
bargaining (infra 3). Important institutional features of the EU can be explained
as reflecting this insight and as efforts to realise the necessary institutional
preconditions of deliberation (infra 4). A deliberative perspective on
postnational governance finally informs normative concerns (infra 5) by
highlighting the need to put additional emphasis on accountability, a broad
representation of societal actors in postnational political institutions and a
legalisation of political interaction.3
2. THE EU AS A HETERARCHICAL STRUCTURE
Because neither international anarchy nor supranational hierarchy are
appropriate concepts for understanding and describing the European polity,
recent integration theory has witnessed a great number of efforts to formulate
new concepts. Most prominent among them is the concept of “multi-level
governance” (cf. Jachtenfuchs, 2001) with its emphasis on norms and ideas
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; March and Olson, 1998), the crucial importance
of transnational networks (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999) and the relevance of
argumentative interaction (Risse, 2000; Müller, 2001). There can be little doubt
that the governance concept has opened up a new conceptual space for thinking
about political order beyond anarchy and hierarchy. It has stimulated a great
number of empirical studies, which have shown that the effective regulation of
social and political relationships can indeed be realised without having to rely on
coercive institutions or on power-based bargaining (Kohler-Koch, 2002; Neyer
and Zürn 2001; Grande and Jachtenfuchs, 2000). What the governance approach
still lacks, however, is its grounding in an alternative principle of political order
that substitutes the two concepts of anarchy and hierarchy. Therefore, it is still
very much limited to pinpointing those elements of the empirical reality which
do not fit into the former two concepts without positively identifying for which
type of political order they stand and why one should not be surprised to observe
them (cf. Jachtenfuchs, 2001: 258-260).
One way of overcoming this deficit is to combine the governance
approach with the notion of a heterarchy (cf. Ladeur, 1999, for an application of
the concept to legal theory). In a heterarchical structure, political authority is
neither centralised (as under conditions of hierarchy) nor decentralised (as under
conditions of anarchy) but shared, which means that the units of a system pool
their authorities with the purpose of a shared execution of governance. Likewise,
the structure of interaction follows neither a vertical logic (as in a hierarchical
setting, in which an author of a rule issues commands, monitors and eventually
enforces compliance), nor a purely horizontal logic (as in an anarchical setting,
in which each individual actor must look unilaterally for ways and means to
interact with other actors) but combines both elements into an integrated mode
of interaction. Political interaction therefore is in permanent need of cross-
border and cross-level communicative processes with the purpose of
accommodating the preferences of the constituent units (both horizontally and
vertically). Therefore, emphasising the heterarchical character of the EU means
accepting the formal sovereignty of the nation-state while arguing that complex
interdependence requires rules for the conduct of interaction and an inclusion of
non-governmental actors in processes of postnational policy-making.4
The concepts of anarchy, hierarchy and heterarchy of course refer to ideal
types. Empirically it will hardly be possible to observe them in purity. An
empirical approximation to a heterarchical structure, however, may be found in
the first pillar of the EU with its parallelism of legislative competencies shared
between the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, and the
sharing of competencies between the Commission and the Member States in the
implementation of rules. In this setting, none of the involved actors can
unilaterally pursue its goals without finding the approval of all other actors. It is
not only that the member states must co-ordinate their preferences among each
other to find enough votes for a qualified majority. The need for co-ordination
also applies to the European institutions. The Council cannot act without a
proposal on the part of the Commission, and again needs the Commission to
promote its implementation. The Commission likewise must formulate its
legislative proposals in a way that is likely to pass the scrutiny of the Council
and the Parliament and must secure member state approval in Comitology for its
implementing measure. Furthermore, because the Commission has only limited
capacities to enforce European law, it invests much effort to safeguard broad
political support for its proposals, to consult with as many interest groups as
possible and to postpone disputed decisions rather than to vote on them.
Successful political interaction in the first pillar of the EU therefore is strongly
characterised by a demand for a shared and co-operative exercise of governance
among the member states and the European institutions.
As these brief explanations already imply, governance (i.e. the intentional
formulation and implementation of inconvenient rules) in a heterarchical multi-
level context requires an inclusive and co-operative mode of interaction. And
indeed, empirical evidence underlines that political interaction in the EU relies
very much on deliberation (Joerges and Neyer, 1997; Lewis, 1998; Gehring,
1998; Eder, 2000) and uses strategies of bargaining or voting only as
instruments of last resort. As Eriksen and Fossum report, in 1994 only fourteen
per cent of all decision adopted by the Council were voted upon. In all other
cases, decisions were adopted unanimously (Eriksen/Fossum 2000: Fn. 7). Much
of European integration theory, however, is highly critical of the empirical
relevance of deliberation. Authors such as Schneider (1995), Moravcsik (1998)
or Tsebelis and Garrett (2001) describe a European polity that is by and large
dominated by monological actors who have little regard for the concerns of
others. So how is it that deliberation can be an important mode of interaction in
multi-level contexts? Is deliberation among representatives not a contradiction
in terms? Or, to say the least, a form of interaction which is largely restricted to
expert communities with low political salience and which becomes immediately
trumped by bargaining if “real” concerns with significant cost implications are
involved?5
This is not the place to produce a systematical collection of empirical data
on the relevance of deliberation in postnational constellations. It is, however, the
place for discussing why and under what conditions cross-level and cross-border
deliberation can be expected to be a dominant mode of interaction and
heterarchical political structures be assumed to perform well. For doing so, the
paper will in the following distinguish between bargaining and different types of
arguing, point out that the specific conditions of the EU produce incentives for
the member states to prefer arguing over bargaining, and show that they have the
means for facilitating it. I will finally take issue with the puzzle that bargaining
still seems to be an empirically more significant mode of interaction than this
approach suggests by pointing to some of the political costs of deliberation.
3. BARGAINING AND DIFFERENT TYPES OF ARGUING
It has become common in the literature to distinguish between two basic forms
of political interaction, namely arguing and bargaining (cf. Elster, 1998;
Habermas, 1992; Risse, 2000). Both types of interaction can be understood as
modes of communication, which consist of an exchange of speech acts that aim
at motivating other actors to accept own preferences as a guideline for collective
action. A basic difference between the two types of interaction lies in their
illocutionary content: While bargaining relies on the use of promises and threats
(including threats of exit),
2 arguing rests on claims of factual truth and/or
normative validity.
3 Arguing is a mode of communication in which actors are
required to state their reasons for advancing claims by referring to consented
norms (Elster, 1998), such as Treaty law (in the EU or the WTO), a constitution
(in a constitutional democracy) or standards of scientific proof. In so doing, a
sample of different interpretations emerges which are accessible for critical
evaluation by third parties. Such evaluations can be conducted by a great variety
of actors. In a democracy it usually is the parliament, which serves as a forum
for critical discourse and as the institution in which demands for justification
and coherence with basic norms are voiced. If these demands remain either
unheard or if the reasons given by a ruling majority are unconvincing to the
minority, it has the option to ask a constitutional court to declare a legislative act
2. According to Jönsson (2001: 218), “bargaining can be understood as the exchange of offers
and counter-offers, concessions and retractions; as bazaar-like haggling in contrast to joint
problem-solving”.
3. By conceptualizing both deliberation and bargaining as forms of communicative action, I
do not follow proposals to treat only deliberation as a type of communicative interaction and
bargaining as a non-communicative form of interaction. Elster (1991) Müller (2001) and
Schimmelfennig (2001) have convincingly argued that deliberation can also be of a strategic
intention if it is chosen because it promises to provide better individual results than
bargaining. It is likewise inappropriate to conceptualize bargaining as a non-communicative
form of interaction because it is conducted by an exchange of speech acts.6
to be anti-constitutional and void. Likewise, any member state in the EU can ask
the ECJ to give an opinion on the integrity of legal actions by any European
institution or member state and demand to declare that action to be incompatible
with the Treaties. In a scientific deliberative setting, finally, it is the community
of scientists, which assesses produced arguments and evidence and which
affirms or rejects them. Although there is broad consensus in the debate on these
basic conceptual orientations, the literature is highly controversial concerning
the conditions under which a deliberative discourse is to be expected. Whilst
some establish very high requirements in terms of individual cognitive
dispositions (cf. Miller, 1995), others focus on institutional requirements (Elster,
1998b), a legalized setting (Joerges and Neyer, 1997) or take it as a general
phenomenon of public discourse (cf. Habermas, 1992; Risse, 2000). One of the
major reasons for this controversy is the fact that it is at least three different
concepts of arguing, which are used in the literature and which each builds on a
specific understanding of the role of discourse in politics.
3.1. Knowledge Based Arguing, Value Based Arguing, and Institution
Based Arguing
A first approach to arguing stems from the work done on the influence of
epistemic communities (groups of non-political experts or scientists who work
in the same profession and share a common problem understanding) in
international politics and conceptualises arguing as a knowledge-based mode of
interaction. As Haas (1992) has shown, epistemic communities can have a
significant impact on international politics if governments have not yet
identified their „national interest“ due to (a) lacking information on the nature of
a problem, (b) unstable domestic interest coalitions or (c) lacking knowledge
about the implications of different policy options on broader governmental
objectives. If these conditions apply, governments are relatively open to non-
political advice by experts. Political interaction therefore is likely to be shaped
by discursive processes among experts, by the application of standards of truth
seeking and follows the logic of appropriateness rather than of strategic
rationality. Although an epistemic community approach promises to underline
the importance of arguing in international politics, it is at the same time highly
sceptical concerning the overall relevance of arguing. By restricting its
probability to situations in which information is scarce and governmental
preferences are not yet identified, it implicitly denies it any central importance.
An alternative approach to arguing, which can be found in
communitarianism, conceptualises it as a value based mode of interaction. As
Miller (1995) and others submit, national communities can be separated from
international communities by their shared notions of ethical values and
principles. These shared notions are not the result of a mere contract among
individuals (as contract theory would argue, e.g. Rawls, 1971) but of a long7
historical process of nation-based communication. In political life, such shared
notions of ethical values both give expression to idea of the nation as an ethical
community and function as the prerequisites of arguments about the meaning of
the common good and about the goals of political action. For the purpose of
understanding communicative interaction beyond the state, a communitarian
approach seems at first hand to be in sharp contrast to the idea of cross-border
arguing. Because it connects arguing to shared ethical concerns, it rejects any
claim that arguing beyond the nation-state can be empirically significant. As
soon as we relax the assumption of an individualistic European world, however,
a communitarian approach becomes more helpful. Assuming that the member
governments have come to accept that the collective exercise of governance is a
necessary means for realising individual member governments preferences, we
have little difficulty to conceptualise governments as “dialogical actors who co-
ordinate their plans through argumentation aimed at reaching mutual
agreements” (Eriksen/Weigard 1997: 221). If we furthermore accept that the EU
is not only a technical instrument for solving problems but also a political
community in which shared ethical concerns (human rights, rule of law,
democracy, etc.) are an important foundation of governance (cf.
Schimmelfennig 2001), we also may think of the EU as a normatively integrated
life world in which only those actors who act collectively responsible behave
rationally. Arguing understood as a form of reasoning that applies shared
normative standards and guides actors by providing incentives to behave
“appropriately” (March/Olson, 1998) becomes plausible.
A communitarian approach, however, also has its limits. Because it views
shared normative concerns as an attribute of a territorially defined social or
political group, it offers little advice for explaining the variance of
communicative rationality in different policy arenas. How to account at the same
time for deliberative forms of interaction (e.g. in comitology or COREPER) and
for the hard bargaining in intergovernmental redistributive issues such as the
conclusion of new financial packages? And how to explain that newly
established institutional requirements to justify own preferences by reference to
legal norms make a difference in terms of modes of interaction? A clear
example for the working of such institutional mechanisms is the introduction of
the principle of mutual recognition in 1979. Before, legislation in the Council of
Ministers was in permanent need to accommodate the preferences of the
Member States in all and every detailed aspect of market making, and heavily
relied on intergovernmental bargaining. To overcome the resulting inefficiency,
the Commission began in 1980 to assume all national restrictions of the free
movement of goods to be illegal if they could not be justified with reference to
public health and safety.
4 Following this decision, legislation had no longer to
4. Communication of the Commission, OJ C 256/1980.8
deal with any preferences that Member States may have, but only with those that
could be formulated in legal language and by reference to well-substantiated
health and safety relevant arguments. To be sure, market-making policy in the
EU is still far from being an apolitical business. What it has achieved, however,
is to transform intergovernmental bargaining into a deliberative mode of
interaction by obliging member states to justify individual actions by reference
to consented norms and to abstain from any action that cannot be justified in
legal terms (cf. Joerges and Neyer, 1997).
If it is true, however, that legal requirements can indeed facilitate
deliberative interaction without recourse to some kind of communitarian “we-
feeling”, it is only a small step to argue that the mode in which actors
communicate can be conceptualised as a function of the opportunity structure of
a given institutional setting. Understood such, it is not a common culture which
is a necessary background for meaningful arguments but institutional
requirements which provide incentives for justification and reason giving.
Arguing then gives expression to the believe of an actor that he (or she) can
advance her interest comparatively well by justifying, explaining and
persuading, and thus by abstaining from using threats or promises. And indeed,
actors may have good reasons to do so: in the EU, for example, good arguments
do not only have the (sometimes rather small) probability of convincing other
governments of the adequacy of one’s own position, but (sometimes far more
important) of making the Commission, the Court or the Parliament willing to
join forces with oneself. Same as good arguments can be tools for tapping the
support of institutional actors, so can bad arguments prompt their opposition. If,
for example, a member government imposes trade barriers against imports from
another member states, it is well advised to produce argumentative justification
and give convincing explanations for the reasons for its actions. If it does so, its
measures will be supported by the Commission (and, if necessary, the Court). If
it acts without justification and convincing arguments, however, it will have to
face the opposition not only of the affected government but also of the
Commission (and, if necessary, the Court), and be confronted with the
corresponding costs. Thus, the acts of giving reasons, of justifying a certain
course of action and of behaving in a communicative mode of interaction may
be strategically motivated and can very well be explained without reference to
communitarian ideas. Institution based deliberation therefore neither depends on
the existence of a historically established and collectively shared ethical concern
(community) nor only on the condition that actors do indeed believe that their
claims are in accordance with a collective norm (honesty) but is well compatible
with a strategic disposition of actors, i.e. the motivation of political actions by
self-minded interests.9
The discussion above has shown that it is necessary to be clear about what
one actually means when using the term “arguing”. Different notions of arguing
refer to different modes of interaction and carry quite different implications
concerning the scope conditions of its empirical relevance. If arguing is analysed
as a mode of problem solving in heterarchical structures, however, one is well
advised to focus on institution based arguing. An institution-based
understanding of arguing has a number of strengths if compared with a
knowledge and a value based understanding. In contrast to the former, its
empirical relevance is not restricted to technical issues but covers all issues
where it makes sense for individual actors to invest resources for trying to
convince other parties. As opposed to a value based mode of arguing, an
institution based mode of arguing is not limited to communities with a collective
identity but can likewise be expected to be an important mode of interaction in
European or international politics. Understood such, arguing is a mode of
interaction that does not follow from some community-based we-feeling, but
can be explained as a rational reaction to the incentives provided by a given
institutional structure.
3.2. The Functional Superiority of Deliberation over Bargaining
After clarifying the meaning of arguing used in the remainder of this paper, a
question which suggests itself for further reflection is to ask what kind of
comparative performance arguing yields if compared with bargaining. For
making the case that the member states of the EU have significant incentives to
engage in arguing, it is necessary to show that arguing is indeed functionally
superior to bargaining. Unfortunately, the theoretical literature on negotiation
and bargaining is not too helpful for analysing the multilateral structure of the
EU. As a number of authors have lamented, multilateral negotiations represent
“one of the least developed areas in negotiation theory” (Hopmann, 1996: 244).
As opposed to most game theoretic approaches, which deal with the rather
simple situation of a two-actor encounter (chicken game, prisoners dilemma,
battle of the sexes, etc.), multilateral negotiations are perceived as “a very messy
affair, almost defying generalizations” (Holsti, 1982: 160). Correspondingly,
systematic comparisons of different types of interaction with regard to their
performance in terms of outcome are hard to find.
5 The next sections try to
reduce this gap by comparing arguing and bargaining in terms of their efficiency
(means-end relation), their effectiveness (goal attainment) and the quality of
output they are likely to produce. Each of them will be discussed below.
5. For a very instructive overview cf. Jönsson (2001).10
3.2.1. Efficiency
The efficiency of bargaining crucially depends on the preconditions that either
the number of participants is small or that power resources are highly
asymmetrical. The perfect setting for a bargaining procedure consists of a group
of only two actors, of which one is strong and rich and the other one is weak and
poor. In such a setting, the group will have little difficulties to arrive at a quick
solution. The strong and rich actor will always be able to either threaten its
partner with negative consequences in case it does not agree to a proposed
solution or to promise to compensate him for any damage that a proposed
solution may imply (Keohane, 1984).
Efficiency becomes a highly problematic issue, however, as soon as the
number of actors and the symmetries in individual power resources rise. Imagine
a setting of fifteen actors in which no single actor is able or ready to shoulder the
costs of enforcing a deal by threatening others or by promising compensating
side-payments. Under such conditions, any possible deal must satisfy the
preferences of all fifteen actors and necessitate a time-enduring process of
balancing individual preferences until one solutions has been identified which
leaves no actor worse off than it had been before (Pareto-Optimum). To be sure,
the practice of negotiations knows a number of ways to respond to problems of
collective action such as coalition-building or issue linkage. None of the two,
however, is without problems: although coalition-building simplifies the
negotiation process by reducing the number of actors, it often entails
intransigent negotiation positions, once consensus is reached within the
coalition, and may thus intensify conflicts among members of opposing
coalitions (Hopmann, 1996: 261). Linking issues with the purpose of allowing
for side-payments or compromise (Haas, 1980) is likewise an often used but not
costless technique: adding new issues to the set of problems already on the table
increases the complexity of possible solutions and therefore tends to increase the
amount of time needed for a successful negotiation process. It is little surprising
therefore, that intergovernmental bargaining at Treaty reforming
intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) or (even worse) at the Ministerial
Conferences of the WTO necessitate intense preparations, and are nevertheless
often close to collapse, leaving all actors exhausted until a deal can finally be
struck.
Whilst bargaining easily runs into serious functional problems if the
number of actors and/or the symmetry of power distribution rises, deliberation
as a mode of interaction is far better equipped to cope with both conditions.
Under conditions of deliberation, any individual preference can be assessed in
terms of its coherence with consented basic norms (such as reciprocity, the
principle of non-discrimination or the precautionary principle) and all those11
preferences, which fail to withstand the test, are taken out of the sample of
possible solutions. To be sure, deliberation does not necessarily lead to only one
solution for a problem. It rather often happens that different and mutually
incompatible proposals are justified as being in accordance with consented basic
norms and that deliberative interaction does not lead to consensus. In any case,
however, deliberative procedures provide a filter that at least narrows the set of
possible solutions and therefore makes political compromise more likely.
3.2.2. Effectiveness
A similar logic applies to the relative effectiveness of policy outcomes under a
deliberative and a bargaining procedure. As opposed to policy outcomes that can
be justified as implications of consented norms, bargains do have no
independent compliance-pull (Franck, 1990) apart from satisfying temporary
preferences. If bargains are the product of threats, all actors on whom an
outcome has been enforced have a strong incentive to defect as soon as possible.
Bargaining can thus hardly satisfy the need for effective norm application if
either no individual actor exists who has the capacity and the readiness to
safeguard adherence to the outcome of a bargain (by shouldering the costs of
monitoring and enforcement), or if the number of actors is too high to allow for
effective monitoring on the part of a single actor (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom,
1996). Furthermore, at least among democracies, the intergovernmental
exchange of promises and threats quickly finds its limits of effectiveness as soon
as those governments on which a deal has been enforced try to implement it
domestically. In most democratic settings, governments will face serious
difficulties to implement international rules if these rules find no social
acceptance, or if they even contradict established normative concerns (cf. Neyer
and Zürn, 2001). Enforced deals therefore are most likely to arouse public
protest and make it highly difficult for governments to comply with them.
As opposed to policy outcomes conducted by means of bargaining,
deliberative norms are part of an overarching normative framework, in which
the coherence of basic norms with more specific norms implies that non-
compliance with a specific rule equals non-acceptance of the implications of
basic rules. Non-compliance with the outcome of a deliberative procedure
therefore not only rejects a specific deal but implicitly opposes the whole
normative structure of which the specific norm is part. Therefore it is a far more
serious issue, which may trigger broader implications for the defecting party.
Furthermore, if a government can sell an unwelcome and costly international
outcome by referring to broadly accepted norms, it will find itself in a much
easier position and will most probably have to face much less domestic political
costs when complying with it.12
3.2.3. Quality
Bargaining is notorious for its weakness in safeguarding a high quality of policy
outcomes. As a decision-making procedure, there are no safeguards for
normative concerns outside of the individual actors’ preferences. Quite on the
contrary, the set of possible solutions to a bargain is defined by the congruence
of a solution with the preferences of all powerful actors with a de facto veto
power (cf. Putnam 1988). Because the win-win set narrows down the more the
larger the number of actors involved is, the more unlikely it becomes that
concerns who are not represented by actors with a de facto veto power, will be
taken seriously. Bargaining is already hard enough and win-win sets are already
small enough to prohibit any further complications of the process. By
implication, policy outputs will be the more according to political calculations
the larger the number of actors involved and the less according to substantive
concerns such as their problem-solving capacity. Thus, a bargaining mode often
frustrates all those who are concerned with the problem-solving capacity of
governance. The efforts to realise a sound international environmental policy (or
to harmonise capital taxation in the EU are both telling examples. In both cases
it was the veto of individual players (the US with regard to international
environmental policy and Luxembourg with regard to taxation), which
prohibited anything but an outcome that satisfied no one. In contrast, any policy
outcome under a deliberative procedure must comply with consented basic
objectives and can be legally challenged if it fails to do so. Deliberative
procedures therefore have the probability not only to improve the efficiency and
the effectiveness of decision-making but also to ensure that diplomatic concerns
do not trump policy relevant concerns.
In sum: if (1) no actor is able or willing to impose its preference on other
actors and to pay the costs of necessary threats or promises (both in terms of
legislative and executive actions), and/or if (2) a group is large, bargaining is
functionally inferior to deliberation in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and the
quality of policy-output. Therefore, if (3) actors have an interest in the co-
operative exercise of governance with the purpose of solving collective
problems efficiently, effectively and with a level of material quality that can be
justified publicly, bargaining can hardly be a preferred option. Under these
conditions, one would expect that governments have significant incentives to
engage in deliberative interaction.13
4. INSTITUTIONAL PRECONDITIONS OF
SUCCESSFUL DELIBERATIONS
Deliberative interaction, however, demands more than just the insight that it is
functionally superior to bargaining. Governments, for example, may have
strategic reasons to pursue their relative autonomy from public scrutiny at the
international level as much as possible (Moravcsik, 1994; Wolf, 1999). The
likeliness of an inclusive deliberative mode of interaction therefore not only
depends on the insight that it is functionally superior to a bargaining mode of
interaction but also necessitates an institutional frame which helps political
actors to overcome narrow-minded political orientations and fosters an inclusive
and disciplined political discourse. It is here again that an institution-based
understanding of deliberation is helpful. Whilst constructive knowledge based
deliberations depend on a social environment that restricts access to those
individuals who command specialized expertise and is most often (and for good
reasons) conducted confidentially until a result is publicly announced (Singer,
1993), institution based deliberations need no such elitism. Quite on the
contrary: the more public an argument is made, the higher is the probability that
institutional actors will feel forced to respond to the claims made and the more
effective can an argument assumed to be. Institution based arguing is also less
demanding than value based arguing: it works without a common identity of the
participants, can be conducted in multicultural environments and does not
presume that actors behave honestly or morally. They just have to accept the
rules of the game as they are laid down in legal regulations or rules of
procedure. Institution-based deliberation, however, presupposes a specific
institutional design that works towards providing incentives to argue. Two of the
most important (although neither necessary nor sufficient) features of such an
institutional frame are openness for all important governmental and non-
governmental stakeholders and a legalised mode of interaction.
4.1. Deliberation and Representation
A first and most important precondition of deliberation is the representation of
all those actors who have important stakes in an issue. An emphasis on as much
representation as possible not only meets with normative requirements (identity
of those who author a rule and those who are affected by it) but also is important
for functional reasons.
A first causal pathway that underlines the importance of representation for
the generation of successful deliberation focuses on the degree to which affected
domestic non-governmental parties accept international norms (social
acceptance). The importance of a reasonably high degree of domestic
acceptance of international norms is basically due to the fact that it is the public
discourse that in all modern democracies determines the definition of the14
common good. Being faced with a situation in which international norms meet
with broad domestic opposition, governments will find it hard to legally
implement or even enforce them. As actors who are in need of public support for
their policies, democratic governments will hesitate to ignore public opinion and
– if facing the decision – rather tend to satisfy their domestic constituencies than
their international partners. A high congruence between international norms and
public opinion therefore is not only important for reasons of democratic
legitimacy but also for reasons of their effectiveness.
A second and interrelated pathway for the impact of representation on
successful deliberation focuses on the degree to which governmental and non-
governmental parties take part in the making of international rules
(participation). Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are of utmost
importance for bridging the differences between governmental and societal
understandings of problem identification and problem solving. Due to their
dependence on voluntary funding by societal actors and the corresponding need
to listen closely to public problem perceptions, NGOs are in direct contact with
public opinion. They therefore have the potential to facilitate discourse between
governmental and societal rationalities and to help avoid situations in which
governments must decide between satisfying the preferences of their domestic
constituency or those of their international partners.
NGOs, however, do not only have a constructive potential but can also
negatively affect the prospects of effective postnational governance. If they are
not either directly integrated in international policy-making and/or if their
concerns are disregarded, they are likely to mobilise media or public protest and
foster political opposition with the effect of shedding serious doubt on the
legitimacy of postnational governance. In particular, the WTO has recently been
harshly criticised for its non-participatory structure. In a statement authored by
1448 NGOs from 89 countries, a large non-governmental coalition (among them
Oxfam, the BUND, Friends of the Earth and Germanwatch) expressed its deep
concern with the non-participatory structure of the WTO and its effects on
democratic governance.
6 Because the rules and procedures of the WTO are
viewed as “undemocratic, intransparent and non-accountable”, any further
extension of the WTO’s competencies is rejected and demands for a
fundamental reform “with civil society's full participation” are raised. In the
same vain, 60 NGOs (among them Greenpeace International, Oxfam and
Friends of the Earth) authored in 1999 a “Joint-NGO General Statement” which
demanded the inclusion of an international parliamentary chamber and the
6. Statement From Members of International Civil Society Opposing a Millenium Round or a
New Round of Comprehensive Trade Negotiations, http://www.greenpeace.de/GP_SYSTEM/
GPFRAM10.HTM15
integration of the European Parliament.
7 To be sure, the potential of NGOs to
directly oppose intergovernmental policies is often limited and countered by
efforts of other NGOs who argue for quite the opposite. The wave of violent
protests since the WTO’s meeting in Seattle, however, should be taken seriously
as giving expression to a widely held concern that postnational governance –
both in the EU and at the international level - must not escape democratic
demands for participation and representation if it the public perception of its
legitimacy is not to suffer.
4.2. Deliberation and Legalisation
Although a high degree of representation of affected parties is an important
condition for the generation of successful deliberation, it is by no means a
sufficient one. Even without the participation of NGOs, postnational political
processes have to cope with a multiplicity of diverging interests and preferences.
They struggle to find collectively acceptable problem-solving philosophies and
are permanently in danger of failing to achieve any results at all. It seems fair to
assume therefore that a high degree of representation only translates into
successful deliberation if it is accompanied by provisions which structure the
discourse, help a social group to cope with its diversity and to make meaningful
discourse possible.
One way of reacting to the problem is to take seriously the insight that
modern societies have learned to cope with their increasing complexity by
developing a new role for legal rules. While law traditionally acted as an
instrument for realising governmental objectives by listing pre- and
proscriptions for societal actors, much of modern law must be understood as an
instrument which aims at enabling complex systems to engage in self-
governance (Teubner and Willke, 1984).
8 Modern law aims at structuring
societal discourses by establishing needs of justification, distinguishing between
good and bad reasons for justifying actions and thereby forcing actors to enter a
discourse about the appropriateness of behaviour. Its basic aim is not to identify
the specific content of the common good by assuming a superior knowledge of a
governing actor but to provide a normative support structure for self-
governance.
9
7. “The Case For Increased Scrutiny By The European Parliament“
http://www.foeeurope.org/trade/epwto_statement.htm
8. In the words of Jürgen Habermas (1992: 78, own translation): "The law acts as it were a
transformer, ensuring in the first place that the network of socially integrative pan-societal
communication does not break down. It is only in the language of law that normatively
meaningful messages can circulate throughout society."
9.  Even if without specified clear pre- and proscriptions, however, legally structured
discourses may not be misperceived as non-binding forms of interaction.16
It is not easy, however, to apply the concept of law to postnational
politics. Traditionally, legal norms are defined by their authorisation on the part
of a governing agent who uses its monopoly of power for guaranteeing
compliance (e.g. Kelsen, 1966). In postnational settings such as the EU, no such
monopoly of power exists. Does that mean that legalisation is a strategy that is
suited for domestic politics only? Obviously not. A more promising alternative
for conceptualising legal norms is to follow recent efforts to develop a gradualist
understanding of law (Abbott et al., 2000). In such a perspective, legal norms
can be distinguished from mere social norms by the degree to which rule
addressees agree on institutional means for eliciting compliance with them. It is
especially three institutional dimensions which are important and which refer to
the monitoring of rule application, the legal effect of rules and the legal
consequences in case of non-compliance. All three dimensions must be
understood as being open to a great variant of different forms with differing
degrees of intensity: Monitoring can vary from relying in the honesty of
contracting parties to the establishment of reporting obligations (human rights
regimes and WTO), and finally the establishment of a central institution with
encompassing competencies to control compliance (as in the EU). Legal effect
can likewise vary from a mere agreement (for example the non-proliferation
treaty) to the setting up of international dispute settlement bodies (WTO) and
can also mean giving direct effect to international rules and granting standing for
individuals (EU). Legal consequences finally can take the form of announcing
non-compliant behaviour (shaming), entail the authorisation of symmetrical
retaliation on the part of a third party (as in the WTO) or allow for the
imposition of lump sums or penalty payments (as in the EU).
Taken together, representation and legalisation must be viewed as
important institutional requirements for facilitating deliberation. Broad
representation widens the scope of participants in political discourses, enables
stakeholders to pursue their interests by means of constructive discourse and
provides incentives to abstain from extralegal political action. Legalisation is a
necessary instrument to structure the discourse and to provide normative criteria
against which preferences can be assessed. It formalises interaction, reduces
problems of free-riding, settles disputes about the adequacy of individual action
and provides (dis)incentives for (non)compliance.
4.3. Empirical Evidence
Although this paper is not the place for systematically gathering empirical proof
for the validity of the nexus between legalisation and representation on one
hand, and effectiveness and efficiency on the other (not to forget the intervening
role of arguing), some well known features of the EU clearly militate in favour
of it. If we compare, for example, the first and the third pillar of the EU, we see
some striking differences both in terms of inclusion and legalisation on the one17
hand and effectiveness, efficiency and quality on the other. The first pillar is
characterised by cooperation between the Council and the Parliament, and the
consultation of a great number of committees, ranging from the Committee of
the Regions to the myriad of comitology committees. As is emphasised in the
literature, interaction in this complex structure is rather rarely dominated by
bargaining: The legalistic character of interaction among the institutions (cf.
Weiler 1991) provides (not always but often) for an argumentative practice in
which only well justified arguments have a fair chance to become effective.
Interests remain important; for being taken seriously, however, they must dress
in legal clothes and refer to consented norms (cf. Burley und Mattli 1993: 72).
Doing so necessitates making an argument compatible with shared norms, which
again implies to subject one’s argument to the “civilizing force of hypocrisy”
(Elster 1998b: 111). Furthermore, the complex institutional structure of the EU
works both effective and efficient: Between 1980 and 1990, the Council adopted
annually about 600 legal acts, which is about six times as much as was adopted
in the same period in Germany (Beisheim et al. 1999: 328-329). In the years
1993 to 1998, all European institutions together adopted about 15.000 legal acts
(Maurer, Wessels and Mittag, 2000: 3). Estimates from the end of the 1980s
guessed that about 80 per cent of the economic law in the member states is of
European origin (Delors, 1992: 12). Likewise, the compliance record (as a proxy
for effectiveness) of the EU is astonishingly good: whereas in the WTO, for
example, non-compliance with trade rules seems to be a systematic element of
their application, the EU nearly always manages to elicit member states
compliance (even it does sometimes take years to do so).
10 Against this
background it comes as little surprise that one of the most efficient and effective
elements of the first pillar is to be found in the highly legalized and
transnationally structured comitology system. Only 11 per cent of all Union
legislation enacted by the Council and EP since 1993 has been directly
implemented by the Member States. The overwhelming majority of Union
legislation is administered by the Commission (Dogan 1997: 38) and therefore
subject to the comitology procedures.
10. To be sure, deficient compliance in European politics is not a marginal problem. In each
of the years monitored the Commission had to send to the member states more than 1,000
letters of formal notice regarding supposed violations of regulations (first stage of the
infringement procedure). Equally striking is that the ratio between formal notices and legal
action is significantly deteriorating. Whilst in 1995 only 7.1 percent of all alleged violations
were dealt with by the Court, this ratio has increased over the years and was in 1999 at 16.6
percent. Interpreting these data is, however, not easy. One reason could be an increasing
reluctance of the member states to shoulder the domestic costs of adapting to intensified
economic interpenetration; but the worsening ratio could also express a certain weariness of
the Commission to conduct time-consuming negotiations with reluctant member states and
therefore, as a result, an increasing readiness to rely on means of legal enforcement. More
detailed comparative analyses can be found in Neyer and Zürn (2001).18
As opposed to the first pillar, decision-making in the third pillar is purely
intergovernmental and knows hardly any participation neither of the EP nor of
affected non-governmental parties. Legalisation is embryonic at best; in most
areas of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, member states can opt in and
out as they like. It is little surprising therefore, that policy-making is most often
described as neither effective nor efficient (Gordon, 1997;  Zielonka, 1998).
Comparing the two pillars with regard to the material quality of policy output
leads to the very same picture. Although there can be little doubt that a number
of EU decisions in the first pillar are to be criticized for being to protective (or
not protective enough, if you prefer), few commentators assess the overall
picture as being disastrous (cf. Eichener, 1997) – which, however, is exactly
what one finds when reading analyses of the output of third pillar politics. The
very same picture emerges when the focus shifts to IGCs. The poor outcome of
the Nice summit, which intended to expand the decision-making capacity of the
EU and ended up maximizing the blocking possibilities of the member states
(Moberg, 2002), is a case in point. It underlines the limits of the problem-
solving capacity of exclusionary bargaining and the need to substitute it with an
inclusionary and deliberative mode of decision-making. Which is, by the way,
exactly what the recently established Convention on the future of the European
Union tries to realize.
Evidence for the soundness of the theoretical arguments developed so far
can also be derived by using them for understanding some of the very specific
institutional features of the EU. The highly legalistic character of the EU and the
central role of the European Commission and the European Court of Justice can
be interpreted as reflecting the insight that constructive non-hierarchical political
discourses demand procedural discipline and institutions that promote it. Viewed
such, the most important functions of European law are to establish a binding
standard of rationality, which allows distinguishing between good and bad
arguments, and to exclude all those ways of arguing and acting which cannot be
coherently justified in terms of a legally codified rationality. Although the ECJ
may look very much like being invested with the task of judging who is wrong
and who is right, it might be better understood as a guardian with the task of
providing incentives for the Member States and the European institutions to act
only in compliance with a codified (legal) rationality. The extension of the
competencies of the European Parliament and the inclusion of hundreds of
advisory and executive committees in the European political process can
likewise be interpreted as expressing the insight that a non-coercive form of
governance will only have the chance to be effective if the addressees of rules
have a say in the formulation of rules. To be sure, the EP and the committee
system formally have clearly different task: whilst the former is an institution
with the task of representing the European peoples and of cooperating in the
making of law, the latter’s role is restricted to advising the Commission. Both,19
however, are similar to the degree that they aim at including affected parties in
the process of rule-making, enabling inclusive discourses and providing
incentives to abstain from using extralegal means of political action. Understood
such, important elements of the institutional structure of the EU can be
interpreted as reflecting the insight that non-hierarchical governance must
emphasise legalism and participation (and de-emphasise majoritarianism and
elitism) if it is to perform efficiently, effectively and lead to a high quality of
output.
4.4. Explaining the Gap: Deliberation, Sovereignty and Accountability
Although the member states can be assumed to have both an interest in the
facilitation of deliberation (under the conditions specified above) and the means
to do so, the practice of European politics still has more significant elements of
bargaining than this analysis so far predicts. The hard bargaining at Treaty
reforming IGCs is a telling case, which even the most sophisticated analysis
would have serious difficulties to dispute. A most important reason for this gap
between what should be the case and what can be observed is the fact that
deliberation does not come without a political price. In a deliberative setting,
any individual preference counts as no more than a subjective claim of
coherence with consented basic norms and may be rejected by the European
partners if it fails to withstand discursive scrutiny. By implication, neither the
idea of sovereignty that resides in a (national) parliament nor that of sovereignty
of a (national) people is easily compatible with European deliberation. Because
sovereignty can in a heterarchical context only be exercised in co-ordination
with non-national political entities, it presupposes a multi-level understanding of
sovereignty that is shared among national publics, parliaments and international
institutions (cf. Pernice, 1999).
A closely related second reason for the gap between theoretically
grounded expectations and the empirical reality is time. States and societies
cannot be expected to be ready for implementing the necessary constitutional
adaptations with the press of a button. A state-centred understanding of
sovereignty lies at the heart of statehood and defines in large parts of the
democratic world its identity. It therefore is only realistic to assume that the
acceptance of a multi-level constitutional structure will only come about as the
product of a long-term learning process that necessitates that both governments
and societies cherish the promises of a postnational polity more than they fear its
costs. That this exercise is far from automatic and smooth is underlined by the
periodic popping up of anti-EU rhetoric in populist parties in Europe.
Overcoming fears of a democratic deficit will very much depend on the degree
to which international institutions are able to establish that kind of general trust
on which national democratic governance rests. Although it is difficult to
formulate easy recipes for dealing with complex issues such as trust-building in20
non-hierarchical multi-level systems (cf. Slaughter, 2001), it seems obvious that
any significant progress presupposes a huge leap towards increased
transparency. It might seem banal to point to the relation between the ability to
control and the readiness to trust but it nevertheless is worth mentioning: Only
by giving the people (and therefore the media) the chance to directly observe
what delegates are doing and what positions they formulate for what reasons,
can they be expected to develop a degree of trust which matches domestic trust.
A reversal of the still dominant tradition of closed-door negotiations and the
opening up of European institutions for public and media scrutiny therefore is
not only a normatively sound demand but also a major precondition for effective
European governance.
5. ON THE LEGITIMACY OF DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE
Whilst deliberative procedures carry the promise to transform international
anarchy into a transnational discourse, it can hardly be overlooked that any
progress towards more postnational governance meets with a number of serious
criticisms. It has been pointed out that the internationalisation of politics
threatens to strengthen the policy discretion of the executives, that international
bargaining is superimposing democratic deliberation, that national Parliaments
are increasingly bypassed and that public oversight is loosing in relevance (to
name just the most important concerns). In sum, it is feared that the costs of an
improved international problem-solving capacity are largely paid in the currency
of the democratic content of politics (among many cf. Scharpf, 1999; Greven,
2000; Slaughter, 2001). Against this background, postnational governance
seems to be a normatively ambivalent undertaking, torn between the need to re-
establish problem-solving capacity and the fear of a reduced democratic content
of politics (Dahl, 1994).
It is difficult, however, to assess the force of those concerns. Applying
normative standards always presupposes to distinguish among different options
and to choose the one, which is adequate for its object of concern (cf. Joerges,
2000). If, for example, intergovernmentalism is right, and governance beyond
the state basically follows the lines of international co-operation with the
purpose of identifying overlapping preferences and reducing transaction costs
(Moravcsik, 1998), most normative concerns are highly exaggerated. Likewise,
if we follow the proposal of Majone (1994) and treat postnational governance as
being merely a kind of outsourced technical agency with the task of setting
standards for the conduct of international trade in goods and services, we will
have little problems in justifying it, apart from demanding even more insulation
of policy making from the partisan concerns of majoritarian decision-making
and to reject any demands for the integration of a redistributive element
(Majone, 1998). If, however, early functionalists are right, and postnational
governance follows the logic of ever closer integration (Haas, 1964), we might21
be far more sceptical, demand the integration of a full-blown parliament and ask
for institutional mechanisms to establish a system of checks and balances among
the legislative and the executive branch of governance. What is clear is that any
assessment of the validity of normative concerns depends on the identification
of an adequate normative standard, which in turn presupposes to have an
analytical concept of postnational governance.
This paper does not side with any of the camps mentioned but has
employed a fourth analytical perspective according to which postnational
constellations both imply the danger of a reduced democratic content of politics
and the chance to promote a new political structure which is effective, efficient
and leads to high quality outcomes. The corresponding recipe for dealing with
postnational constellations focuses on the adaptation of formerly nation-state
restricted democratic procedures to the changing socio-economic and political
realities. It offers a third way of conceptualising political order beyond hierarchy
and anarchy that centres on accommodating the different democratic systems of
its member states by means of discourse without aiming to replicate the national
state on a European level. Following a deliberative-heterarchical understanding
of governance, effective and legitimate policymaking demand very much the
same answer. Both can be promoted by a set of procedures that bind the three
levels of governance into one discursive structure. At the intergovernmental
level, a high degree of legalisation is necessary to provide an institutional frame
with binding decision-making and – application procedures that allows for non-
coercive enforcement. In its first pillar, the EU has already developed a long
way along this road. The powers of the Commission to monitor the application
of EU law and to sue member governments if they fail to comply, the right of
the member governments to sue European institutions and to ask the Court to
declare a legal act to be void in case of contradictions between secondary and
primary law, and the legal duty to consult regional actors in case they have a
relevant interest in the subject matter are some of the more important steps on
this way.
Dangers, however, exist as well: the new emphasis on the European
Council (and procedures such as the Open Method of Coordination (De la Porte
and Pochet, 2002)  threatens to disentangle intergovernmental policy making
from the procedures described above. They represent a new reorientation
towards strengthening inter-executive policy discretion and may be interpreted
as elements of a creeping de-legalisation of the EU. At the transnational level,
the integration of private interest groups is required to give voice to domestic
concerns and provide for a critical reflection of predominant problem-solving
philosophies. Although the EU has with regard to non-state actors realized a
degree of inclusion far beyond that of any other international institution (e.g. the
co-decision procedure and the many advisory committees), the most important22
step still remains to be taken: if the Council indeed claims to be the primary
chamber of the European legislation, it should open its doors to the European
media and comply with the requirement that law making in a legitimate polity
may not be a confidential procedure. The either direct or indirect participation of
the public in European law making is crucial in order to relieve the tension
between domestic and intergovernmental rationalities and to generate social
acceptance for international regulations. Only informed citizens will trust their
government and be ready to attribute it legitimacy. Therefore, what counts in the
process of shaping post-national governance is the search for a complex set of
procedures that can bring about a continuous discursive process among
international organisations, governmental addressees and affected domestic
parties on collectively acceptable regulations and the modalities of their
application. Transparent multi-level deliberation is the first best means to realise
that objective.
One may question whether such a political structure deserves the label
“democracy”. Maybe not. Maybe it only takes issue with legitimate governance
rather than with democratic governance (cf. Joerges, 2000). That, however, must
not be a weakness of the approach but can be defended for the reason that it is
not yet clear how some of the crucial preconditions of a democratic polity can be
realised in multinational multi-level contexts. Demands for a full-blown
European democracy must take the concern seriously that democracy cannot
exist without a living public sphere in which positions and preferences are
exchanged and mutual learning takes place (Rawls, 1997). That, however, will
be difficult to realise in the foreseeable future beyond the state (Greven, 2000).
A deliberative heterarchical approach to European governance takes the
principle of subsidiarity seriously by abstaining from any unnecessary relocation
of authority and leaving the democratic nation-state as intact as justifiable. To be
sure, asymmetrical power distributions in terms of material, normative and
cognitive resources will even under conditions of deliberation remain important
elements of the empirical world. As readers will know, making good arguments
necessitates the investment of resources. An emphasis on deliberation therefore
must go hand in hand with redistributive elements, aiming at spreading expertise
and empowering actors to participate in communicative settings. Contributing to
this process is not only in the interest of those who remain unheard today. If it is
true that the public perception of the legitimacy of postnational governance
becomes an increasingly important factor for its effectiveness, even powerful
states will have incentives to transform power dominated diplomacy into
transparent, fair and rule-oriented discourses.
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